People’s Republic of China: cooperation on equal terms?

Until recently, there was an almost unrestricted belief that even in global science, the People’s Republic of (PR) China is no longer “bypassing”. The vast dimensions of human capital, physical equipment and financial support in Chinese research infrastructure and the potential for vast new data sets are a distinct attraction for international cooperation partners. In addition, the rapid rise of Chinese institutions and researchers in almost all international science rankings, as well as the change from simple mass to fractional world-class output (for example, based on global citation indices over the past few years), New Chinese Prove science policy to be an impressive success.

In addition to the allure of this quantitative expansion and the increasing importance of Chinese science – or precisely because of it – there have recently been qualitative and normative concerns in Germany. Diffuse signals about a possible major strategy by the Chinese political leadership intensify this uncertainty. In a speech in May 2021, Xi Jinping, president and general secretary of the Communist Party of China, underlined that “scientific and technological innovation has become a main battlefield of international strategic competition” and that VR aims to become the leader among the ten high technologies. Be No.1 in the world power science and research by 2035 and by 2050. Undoubtedly ambitious goal. Nonetheless, Xi repeatedly emphasizes that technological and scientific innovation requires international cooperation. Overall, the German and Chinese sides agree that cooperation is essential for scientifically informed solutions to global problems (climate change, ecological and environmental problems, epidemics, etc.) in the 21st century. However, questions about the framework of this collaboration are becoming more delicate.

Similarities and differences in expectations

In the context of increasingly intense debates, it is also becoming clear how little insight there is into the differences and similarities in the working of science in China and the expectations of cooperation partners in general. Originally, “freedom of science” in the European sense did not exist in China. The state expects that the contribution of research projects and scientists will be at the top for solving practical questions in the country and for the development of national prosperity. This has not only been the case since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949, but is rooted in political culture and was not handled differently in the Republic of China in the 1930s and 1940s, for example. Even at that time, the ruling Guomindang introduced a “party curriculum” in schools and universities, and training guidelines stipulated that the interests of the nation should prevail. In the 1930s, author and philosopher Lin Yutang described the following paradox: while Chinese practical thinking captures the object of research “as a living whole”, Western logic breaks it down into “various manifestations”. There are clearly clear differences with regard to the path to the acquisition of scientific knowledge and the status of science in and for society – an aspect that should form part of the scientific dialogue between cooperation partners.

“The Chinese state hopes that science will mainly contribute to the solution of practical issues in the country and the development of national prosperity.”

In general, there is still a clear interest among European science representatives in maintaining and expanding cooperation with Chinese partners. Nevertheless, more sensitivity and caution as well as more systematic rules are now needed to deal with the Chinese side. This should be particularly applicable when contractual agreements on scientific cooperation are concluded. The focus is on:

• Concerns about the lack of transparency in the design and management of partnership and joint projects,
• A possible discrepancy in notions of “good scientific practice”, particularly in the context of research ethics and scientific integrity,
• as well as potential deviations from relevant regulations, risks of dual use and poor protection of intellectual property
• Political instruments threatening joint events and research results by Chinese authorities.

In this context, it is becoming clear that the European side would like to encourage China to base certain standards of cooperation in the exchange of research and technology – they also declare them as a condition for cooperation. Joy Zhang, a professor of sociology at the University of Kent, explicitly criticized this method of unilateral setting guidelines. In debate it makes more sense to learn to understand each other in this regard. She also points out that Chinese scientists are frustrated that their Western allies are starting to withhold research data. A direct dialogue between scientists on both sides on issues of scientific quality assurance, standard practice and research ethics actually seems wiser and more productive than an attempt by politicians to unilaterally set standards. This is an approach, in our opinion, still rarely tested, even when all difficulties are taken into account. The “Beijing Declaration on Basic Science” adopted by Leopoldina and the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS) in 2019 may be an interesting example in this regard and its impact should be carefully evaluated.

Differentiation Necessary

At present, in the increasingly polarized public debate, many other aspects are being neglected: first, the European perspective often does not differentiate between the Chinese state and scientists or the state and universities. Since “everything” in China is subject to the party state, according to the underlying logic, ultimately all Chinese, including universities, academics, and students abroad, are considered “propagators” or even potential “spies” of the Communist Party. should be seen as However, this blanket “profiling” also has its downsides, for example the growing isolation and isolation of Chinese scientists and students in Europe, who view domestic Chinese politics very critically, but who increasingly distrust them, simply because that they are Chinese.

Differentiation is also necessary with respect to the scientific landscape in the PRC. For example, there are clear differences in the treatment of the social and anthropological sciences, which are subject to more political observation and control than the natural and technological sciences. Especially in the latter, China is working its way to the top of the world. As far back as before, it is currently aimed primarily at focusing on domestic problem solving. The fact that there is considerable contentious public debate about it is – to name just one example – the contribution of the renowned political scientist Yu Keping (Peking University), who criticized the excessive emphasis on “Chinese specificities” by Chinese social scientists. . Interview published in January 2021, as it rejects the idea of ​​science as universal knowledge production and theory building. Instead of arguing about “Chinese specialties”, Chinese scientists should think and communicate more internationally. He also voted for “freedom of thought and a free educational environment for scientists”.

There are also significant differences between individual universities in China. This is due, among other things, to the political culture in the different provinces, whereby universities – especially in the East Coast provinces – with wider external cooperation relationships generally prove to be more open than in central or western China. Long-term, close cooperation relationships with Chinese institutions and individual scientists have a balancing and productive effect, through which trust has developed and which are more stable. Our own experience shows that even in the current pandemic, scientific communication works surprisingly well and widely through these established networks, even in digital formats.

“Many Chinese scientists are proud of and make it known – including their country’s scientific achievements.”

Furthermore, cooperation processes must recognize that many Chinese scientists, like the general public, take pride in the achievements – including scientific – that their country has made over the past few decades, and they make it known. Not taking this seriously or acknowledging that Chinese allies may also have an intrinsic interest in research and knowledge and are able to apply it even in hostile environments would be arrogant and detrimental to their opportunities for cooperation and improvement.

Overall, it should be welcomed that scientific organizations and authorities in Germany and Europe are currently considering their cooperation with partners in China based on real experiences, global dynamics and new signs of China. Ultimately, we can effect these developments only with and through an equal level of cooperation. Not only at the science policy level, but special bilateral or multilateral scientific dialogue between scientific associations or partner universities can be helpful here. Nevertheless, cooperation at the individual level should be particularly encouraged. While larger institutions are more likely to guarantee dialogue about common political and legal principles – and, if necessary, their preservation, scientific values ​​are ultimately realized in concrete work and in the intercultural dialogue process among researchers. and their importance is assessed in the global scientific system. Last but not least, political appropriation is more difficult here than on the big platforms.

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